The latest 911 and most exclusive Porsche 911will have its global debut at the Moscow auto show on August 25th, 2010 in Crocus Expo.

The Porsche 911 GT2 RS is the fastest and most powerful road-going sports car ever built in the history of Porsche. The car is packed with the ideal ingredients for an ultra-high-performance sports car with supreme agility and truly blistering performance on the road. Perfectly illustrating Porsche Intelligent Performance, the 2011 GT2 RS achieves a reduction of approximately 5 percent for both fuel consumption and CO2 emissions when compared with the previous 911 GT2. With horsepower (hp) up by 90 and weight down by 154 lbs (70 kilograms) in comparison with the previous 911 GT2, the new 911 GT2 RS has a power-to-weight ratio of just 4.9 lbs (2.21 kg) per horsepower, by far the best power/weight ratio in its class

The 3.6 liter six-cylinder boxer engine features two variable turbine geometry turbochargers and provides power to the rear wheels exclusively through a six-speed manual gearbox. Equally impressive stopping power comes from Porsche Composite Ceramic Brakes (PCCB).

New tires were specifically developed for the 911 GT2 RS and measure 245/35 ZR 19 at the front and 325/30 ZR 19 at the rear, delivering cornering performance to match the straight-line speed. Extreme cornering dynamics are ensured by the setup of the springs, Porsche Adaptive Suspension Management (PASM), unique anti-roll bars, specific engine mounts and recalibrated Porsche Stability Management (PSM), whose stability and traction control functions can be switched off individually.

The combined effect of these developments is evident on the racetrack. In fact, the ultimate 911 accelerates from 0-60 in 3.4 seconds, boasts a top-track speed of 205 mph and laps the famed Nurburgring-Nordschleife racetrack in just 7 minutes and 18 seconds.

Unique Looks, Limited Production, Worldwide Appeal

In its looks, the new 911 GT2 RS stands out clearly from the other 911 models through the lavish use of carbon-fiber-reinforced components with a matt-black surface finish, even wider wheels (including flared wheel arches at the front), new light-alloy wheels with central locking and "GT2 RS" model designations on the doors and rear lid. Matte-finish carbon also graces the redesigned front spoiler lip and the 3/8th of an inch (10 mm) taller rear spoiler lip - which both enhances aerodynamics and provides extra downforce.

The interior of the 911 GT2 RS also exudes sporting performance in virtually every detail. Lightweight two-piece bucket seats made of carbon-fiber-reinforced plastic are standard, as are lightweight door panels with fabric straps instead of traditional door handles. The basic interior color is black, which contrasts with red elements, such as the seat center sections, the roof lining and segments of the steering wheel rim. The gearshift and handbrake lever are also finished in red alcantara.

Limited to just 500 units worldwide, the 911 GT2 RS will have a MSRP of $245,000.

by Oleg Nikishenkov

Moscow could be set for a taste of prohibition as a conflict between the city government and fire inspectors appears headed for deadlock, potentially paralysing the drinks industry.

The City Duma has appealed to the prosecutor general to intervene after deputy Alexander Semennikov called a session on the issue, telling The Moscow News the situation "smelt of a dry law" and was a "stalemate". 

The crisis kicked off on April 8 when Moscow's license registry department stopped accepting applications to obtain alcohol licenses. City Hall explained that this was due to a conflict with the Emergency Situations Ministry's fire inspectors, who had refused to issue fire safety certificates, a requirement to get permission to sell alcohol.


15,000 licenses

The city government has issued 15,000 licenses to retailers and restaurateurs, most of them having a maximum duration of five years, while the city's head of consumer affairs, Vladimir Malyshkov, said they had "completely stopped issuing new ones".

"[The situation is] very alarming for the industry and may lead to a collapse of retail alcohol distribution [if it is not resolved soon]," said Malyshkov.

Alcohol manufacturers and traders faced a similar crisis in 2006 when the implementation of a new regulations caused confusion, and the Union of Alcohol Market Participants estimated that the industry lost $230 million.


Helping small businesses?

The emergency ministry's inspections department said it was simply following federal government instructions to stop inspections to reduce the burden on small businesses.

"To reduce the number of inspections of small and medium-sized businesses, the [country's] chief fire inspector, Gennady Kirillov, [ordered] the termination of supervisory activities of enterprises ... engaged in the retail sale of alcoholic beverages," said Yury Deshevy, the head of the inspections department.


Dodging responsibility

While the city government says the emergencies ministry is shunning its responsibilities, Malyshkov, the City Hall official, says he does not want the burden either.

"[City Hall] doesn't have either qualified or authorised specialists to do fire inspections on sites and issue fire safety certificates," he said.

Malyshkov said that businesses were required to submit 12 documents to get a liquor license, and if even one was missing the city would not issue it. 

Deshevy pointed to the contradiction between the federal authorities' decision to halt inspections of stores by his ministry, while regional and city administrations still require these safety checks. The fire officer appealed to City Hall to change local legislation.


Perm nightclub tragedy

Following the deaths of 156 people in a nightclub fire in Perm, fire inspectors have come under intense pressure to ensure the safety of the public.

"We might agree on cancelling fire certificate requirements for warehouses, but never for public places such as clubs, restaurants or stores," said Malyshkov.

In the first quarter of 2010, the emergencies ministry's fire inspectors filed 770 cases against clubs and restaurants in the Central Federal District, of which Moscow is a part, over fire safety violations.


Cleanup plans?

Experts say that this could be part of government plans to clean up and consolidate the alcohol industry, making it simpler to obtain an alcohol license but remaining in control through subsequent inspections.

"There are too many [alcohol producers and distributors]," said Vadim Drobiz, the director of the Research Centre on the Federal and Regional Alcohol Market. "Currently, the liquor industry is only working at 30 per cent [capacity]."

The government has already started introducing tougher alcohol laws including minimum prices for vodka and banning kiosks selling strong alcohol and shops selling it late at night.

This "allowed the share of legal vodka to increase by 10 per cent," said Drobiz.


Anti-alcohol campaign

President Dmitry Medvedev has campaigned to decrease the consumption of alcohol from 18 litres a year to 8 litres by 2020.

"Eight litres of pure alcohol a year is a World Health Organisation safety threshold," said Yury Gusev, head of Preodoleniye (Overcome), a programme for treating alcohol and drug addicts. "Alcohol is the main reason for the high mortality rate of the Russian workforce, which is five times higher for men compared to Western Europe."


Fatal addiction

Russians are drinking themselves to death, with one survey finding that alcohol was the cause of 59 per cent of fatalities in men and 33 per cent in women who died between the ages of 15 and 54.

The survey, conducted by Oxford University and the Russian Cancer Research Centre, found that most of the deaths were the result of alcohol poisoning, accidents, violence or diseases such as liver failure, TB, pancreatitis and pneumonia. The researchers checked official records and asked the families of 30,000 dead men and 20,000 dead women in the cities of Tomsk, Barnaul and Biysk.

"If current Russian death rates continue, then about 5 per cent of all young women and 25 per cent of all young men will die before age 55 years from the direct or indirect effects of drinking," Professor Sir Richard Peto of the Clinical Trial Service Unit at the University of Oxford wrote in the report.

This article originally appeared on the Moscow Center of Economic Planning's web site http://english.ecoplan.ru/

By Gordon Hahn

Again Stratfor has raised the spectre of wide-ranging Russian political interference and military intervention across the former Soviet space (“Russia: Unrest as a Foreign Policy Tool,” Stratfor, April 28, 2010, 1208 GMT, www.stratfor.com).

It does so by discussing once more “tactics” and “levers” that Moscow “could” use or supposedly is using to divide and rule its neighbors. Stratfor provides no evidence that Russia has used these levers in the past or is prepared to so in the future.  Put another way, there is no evidence that Russia has ever used the tactics and levers noted by Stratfor beyond the degree to which most democratic powers have employed in the past; that is, in order to maintain influence or stability in countries where they have vital national interests.

Although some of the analysis is sharp and relevant in general terms, much of it reads like U.S. government internal memos in which might have been used by U.S. officials for future contingencies to expand U.S. power.  Also, Stratfor gives us the misnomer that “Russia” used these tactics “throughout the Cold War.”  The USSR (not Russia) was led by an ideological state which was antithetical to Russian interests and based on an internationalist communist ideology that killed tens of millions of Russians, among others, and retarded the economic and political development of Russian society for decades.

But let us get to the rather lean meat of Stratfor’s main arguments.  Stratfor claims that Russia has employed two tactics: gas policy and “military intervention.”  We will not dwell on the fact that many countries use forms of energy policy and military intervention to influence politics, not least of all the government for which many Stratfor analysts once worked.  According to Stratfor, Russia “Cut supplies that transit Ukraine to bring pressure from the Europeans to bear on Kiev and cut energy supplies that transit Russia from the Central Asian states. This gradually led to a pro-Russian government taking power in Ukraine and a more pragmatic government taking office in Lithuania, and has kept Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan beholden to the Kremlin.” This healthy overstatement cannot hold up to any serious scrutiny.

Ukrainians voted in Viktor Yanukovych for president over the Orange revolution’s President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, not because of Russian gas policy. They did so because Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were constantly fighting, they mismanaged the economy, supported Ukrainian nationalist policies that bitterly divided the country, and conducted a one-sided, anti-Russia foreign policy that exacerbated the divisions between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians.

To boil down Yushchenko’s defeat to Russian gas policy is severely reductionist. Its intent was to blame Russia for “neo-imperialist” interference in Ukrainian politics.  The evidence shows that it was Ukraine that was siphoning off gas illegally and refusing to switch to world market prices.  Indeed, a main driver of Ukraine’s gas politics was the above mentioned infighting between Yushechnko and Tymoshenko.  Both were jockeying for control of resources and political supremacy.  Thus Stratfor’s assertion that the election of Viktor Yanukovych was solely or even largely the result of Russian gas policies is an absurd.

Regarding the Baltic countries, contrary to Stratfor’s analysis, Russia is in no position to bring about the Baltic states’  “Finlandization” or neutrality or to achieve “veto power over any political or security decision” those states make.  As EU and NATO members, the Baltic states are completely autonomous from Russia in their political and security decsionmaking.  The Baltic countries’ general economic incompetence and corruption also have been at the heart of their challenges.

Kazakhstan has numerous reasons to stay close to the Kremlin beyond gas policy: a long history and thick web of economic ties, as a counterbalance to a rising China;  protection against jihadism; and cooperation in high technology spheres like defense and space, plus a large ethnic Russian minority keeps Kazakhstan and Russia close.  Turkmenistan was in fact maintaining its distance from Moscow and everyone else under Saparmurat Niyazov’s quasi-autarchy policy.  Turkmenistan has been less autarchic and slightly more cooperative on gas policy with Russia and Ukraine since Niyazov’s death as well as with Iran and China; something Russia has not objected to.

Regarding military intervention, Stratfor asserts, “Russia simply has based its military in the states, like Moldova and Armenia.  In other cases, Russia has gone to war; the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war ended with Russia technically occupying a third of Georgia’s territory.”  These simplifications by Stratfor are so serious as to stupefy even the most intelligent reader.

Russia did not simply decide to station troops in Moldova and Armenia.  Russian troops in those countries are remnants of Soviet troops stranded there after the Soviet collapse.  Civil wars involving both of these states had different effects on the politics of these troops’ continued basing in these former Soviet Union republics.  In Moldova, Kishinev’s war with largely Russian- and Ukrainian-populated Transdnestria forced Moscow to reneg on promises to withdraw the 14^th army.  In Armenia, Yerevan’s war with Azerbaijan reduced any Armenian resolve to rid itself of Russia’s 102^nd Military Base with its Motor Rifle Brigades.  The emerging threat of jihadism in the Caucasus may extend the duration of the Russian bases there beyond any future Armenian-Azeri peace agreement regarding Nagorno-Karabakh or Armenian-Turkish rapprochement.  Similarly, Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are there as a result of bilateral agreements between Russia and those states.  In the former case, Russian troops were invited after the Soviet collapse.  In the latter, the previous Soviet presence was renegotiated producing the Russian presence.

Regarding the August 2008 Georgian war, such alarmist analyses mention Russia’s ‘invasion’ and ‘occupation’ of Georgian territory (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) without mentioning Tbilisi’s initiation of the August 2008 war with the indiscriminate bombing of a city with thousands of artillery rockets, Georgia’s past brutal policies vis-à-vis Georgia’s breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the de facto independence of the ‘occupied’ South Ossetia and Abkhazia for 15 years prior to the August 7th, 2008 attack, and the unintended but nevertheless provocative role played by NATO expansion and U.S. and Western support for the rather russophobic and untrustworthy Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili.

Regarding contemporary events in Georgia, the opposition leaders’s visits to Moscow, emphasized by Stratfor, constitute no more interference in Tbilisi’s charged politics than do these same leaders’ visits to Washington.

Finally, Stratfor claims that the anti-Tulip revolution last month in Kyrgyzstan represents Russia’s use of a new tactic – one borrowed, it can be argued, from the West’s arsenal: the fomenting of unrest against the regime, i.e., a “colored revolution.”  Although there is limited evidence that the West directly fomented the tulip-, rose-, orange-colored revolutions, there is no doubt that Western governmental assistance to non-governmental organizations and explicit moral support helped to create the tinderbox that needed only a match to spark those revolts.  There is some limited but rather scanty ‘evidence’ that Russia engaged in a policy that had the same effect but utilized less intrusive tools.  Afterall, meetings with opposition leaders and denial of economic assistance are the routine stuff of foreign policy, not interference in the domestic politics of another country.

Analyses like Stratfor’s piece are intended to create fear about a supposed “resurgence of Russian imperialism” rather than spark an intelligent discussion of Russia’s return to its natural status as a regional power and its implications for a new West-Russia policy.  Standard foreign policy tools are interpreted by Stratfor as sinister ‘levers of control’––even if they were never used.

Moscow is portrayed as seeking to reduce the sovereignty of Russia’s neighbors until they can be painlessly reincorporated into a revivied empire similar to the old USSR.  A small Customs Union involving Russia and several friendly, weak or failing states is seen in this same light, even as Brussels creates a political union subsuming the sovereignty of the viable and strong states of all Europe.   Such analyses may appeal to specific funders and make good fodder for sensationalist journalism, but they contribute little to a nuanced, dispassionate discussion of U.S. foreign policy toward Russia.

A more important problem to ponder in this connection is the contradiction between Russian and U.S. interests in the Russian near abroad about whichStratfor is so concerned.  Whereas Russia has declared vital national interests only in countries located on the surrounding Eurasian landmass and mostly along its borders, the U.S. and other Western powers claim vital national interests across the oceans and the entire globe, including along Russia’s unstable periphery; a region often obsessed over but poorly understood by Western policymakers.

Indeed, U.S. foreign policy has seemed to have been based on the assumption that America has the right to defend its national interests many thousands of miles away in Somalia or Tbilisi (?!) and that the world inevitably is a better and safer place if Russia is incapable of extendin power or influence beyond its borders. These assumptions evolved into another in which Russia is viewed as having no right to maintain significant influence even ten miles beyond its border in Tskhinval(i), Astana, or Yerevan.

To what extent should these assumptions have been eschewed immediately when the issues were brewing?  To what extent should they be revised now?  To what extent should we take into account our limited resources to act unilaterally across the globe, including against Russian interests?  Have we overextended our resources beyond that which even our (once) vital economy can handle?  If so, would not it make sense to partner with, rather than aggressively compete with Russia in the former USSR space?

Truly objective analyses of Russia’s intent and capacity are central to any good answers to these questions. Stratfor could do better in contributing to this inquiry.

Dr. Gordon Hahn is a Senior Researcher in the Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program and an Adjunct Professor at the Graduate School of International Policy Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies and a Senior Researcher at the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group. He is author of two books: Russia's Islamic Threat (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007) and Russia's Revolution From Above: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime, 1985-2000 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002)

By Marina Morozova

Head of Property Department, IntermarkSavills

Major trends

Throughout the course of April 2010 demand for elite rental property increased by 59% in comparison with the average index for Q1 of the current year and corresponds with the results recorded in April 2009. Growth of prospective tenant activity and an increase in the number of concluded lettings is typical for this period as many clients wish to conclude their rental searches ahead of the holidays in May and the commencement of the summer season.

Throughout the course of April the average rental rate requested by potential tenants increased by 12%, in comparison with March, and approached pre-crisis levels reaching $6,460 per month (in March 2010 the average tenant budget was recorded as $5,770 per apartment per month). In April 2010 demand for the most expensive properties (from $10,000 and upwards per month) increased by 8% in comparison with the results recorded in the previous month.

The supply of available rental properties in the elite sector of the market decreased by 5% compared to the figures recorded in March 2010. The number of apartments in the budget range of up to $4,000 fell by 3% due to their moving to higher pricesegments. The share of properties at the upper pricing level (from $15,000 per apartment per month) remained at the level of the previous months – approximately 4%.

At the end of April the average marketed rental price (requested by potential landlords) was not subject to a significant change and was recorded as $5,900 per apartment per month.

Expert’s view

In spite of the increase in potential tenants’ activity recorded in April of the current year, it is too early to announce a stable increase in tenant demand going forward. The elite rental market continues to offer relative stability and as a result, landlords of apartments which are in low demand or which had been initially overpriced, should either be prepared to agree to discounted offers, or choose to wait for “their” client rather than count on extremely high demand or abrupt price growth.

High oil, China demand. The equity-market outlook continues to be very favorable. Oil is trading significantly above the level assumed in the budget, investors are rebuilding Russia exposure, Chinese demand is boosting metals & mineral prices, and assets are inexpensive. Our year-end RTS target gives 28% upside, and the market is on course to regain its record May 2008 high (60% upside) by mid-2011.

When to switch drivers. The best-performing themes in 2010 thus far have been those exposed to Chinese commodity demand and industries involved in restructuring. Oil & gas has lagged badly, as have many domestic themes. The issue for investors is when to switch from global to domestic themes (certainly by the middle of this year on current evidence).

This is the lead to the April 16th Equity Strategy report from Uralsib Bank. The full report is available at http://www.uralsibcap.ru/analytics/strategy.do

By Gordon M. Hahn

Reducing U.S.-Russia’s nuclear arsenals and preventing the creation of new ones elsewhere around the world is bound to improve the prospects for cooperation in other areas of the relationship and is an enormous plus for international security.

However, the core problem in U.S.-Russian relationship is the conflict between Russia’s preference that states along its borders are friendlier to Russia than to far-away states and America’s desire to expand its influence into Russia’s neighboring states.

What really drives Russian resistance and paranoia to that expansion means that these areas would be militarized  through NATO expansion.  Russia could live with the growing influence of the U.S. in the economies, cultures and political systems of its bordering states.  Their economies, cultures, and political styles in most cases are more similar to, than different from, Russia’s––by virtue of historical ties.  Familiarity gives Moscow a real comparative advantage.

However, NATO expansion to Russia’s borders put the West’s growing influence under a veil of suspicion in Moscow.  NATO expansion undermined the U.S.-Russian relationship and West-Russia relations in three ways:

1.   It paved the way for other Western security policies that incurred costs for Russia.  One round of NATO expansion led to another.  NATO expansion without Moscow and against its will, led to NATO’s bombing of Belgrade and the dismantling of Yugoslavia, despite international law’s support for state sovereignty and a UN resolution honoring Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity.  It also led to military bases in new NATO member-states Bulgaria and Romania, Washington’s abandonment of the ABM Treaty, and plans to place components of an ABM system on the territory of NATO’s new member states.  The bases in Bulgaria and Romania and, if carried through, ABM system components in Poland and Czeck Republic are violations of the NATO-Russian Founding Act that established the NATO-Russia consultative council and forbade the stationing of any NATO troops or military equipment on the territory of NATO’s new member-states.

2.  NATO expansion and the subsequent changes in the West’s security architecture incurred economic costs on Moscow. Expansion to the former Warsaw Pact states meant not only that world history’s most powerful military alliance was moving towards Russia’s bordering states but that Moscow would lose all hope of maintaining access to the Eastern European arms market at a time when its defense industry was still central to its post-Soviet economy then in a deep depression.  Expansion to Ukraine would have meant not only that the alliance would be on Russia’s borders but that the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine would be de-russified over time, reducing Russian cultural and economic influence, and Russia would have to build a new naval base for its Black Sea Fleet based in Ukraine’s Crimea at considerable cost.

3.  NATO expansion in effect militarized the West’s democracy promotion policies, economic expansion, and even cultural activities in the post-Soviet space.  For Moscow, democratization, EU policies, and even declining Russian-language use in the region came to be seen increasingly as ways of facilitating NATO’s expansion east, not as goods in and of themselves.  This is why the colored revolutions were so disdained in Moscow; disdain and distrust mounted when the ostensibly democratic colored revolutions proved in most cases to be less than truly democratic and more a gateway to possible NATO membership and to access to energy resources at Moscow’s expense.

Every country wants friendly (or at least weak) neighbors, so there is no direct threat.  This becomes clear if we view NATO expansion and Russia’s reaction to it through the prism of a counterfactual: How would the US respond if Russia was leading a military alliance in the Americas that was about to include new members like Canada and Mexico, with all of their security, economic, cultural importance for the US.  If Russia has little or no influence in neighboring, especially Slavic countries like Ukraine, then it is clearly unable to protect its influence and interests farther afield.  This is exactly why Russia had to respond with force to Georgia’s aggression against North Ossetia.

NATO expansion increases the power of countries joining it by improving their militaries’ capacity and supplementing them with the armed forces world history’s most powerful military alliance.  This enhanced capacity increases the potential threat to Russia.  It might also increase the real threat by encouraging antagonistic neighboring states to miscalculate by overestimating the real level of support NATO will provide in any conflict with Moscow; Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili is the best case in point.

Growing capacity and the rising threat in turn undermines Russian interests, weakening its influence in the region and forcing on Moscow greater budget expenditures on national security to compensate for its loss of buffer states and bases.

All states base their security and foreign policy calculations on the capacity of other states, especially in neighboring states, not on their intentions, which can shift over time and might not prevail in the messy policymaking process.  So Washington and Brussels can repeat ad infinitum that NATO is not a threat to Russia, but a simple balance of power calculus of NATO capacity says otherwise.  And they know that in Moscow.

~~~

Dr. Hahn is author of the well-received books Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007) and Russia’s Revolution From Above, 1985-2000 (Transaction Publishers, 2002) and numerous articles in academic journals and other English and Russian language media. He has taught at Boston, American, Stanford, San Jose State, and San Francisco State Universities and as a Fulbright Scholar at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia. Dr. Hahn also has been a fellow at the Kennan Institute and the Hoover Institution. He is currently a visiting professor and senior researcher for terrorism research and education program at Monterey Institute of International Studies.

This commentary originally appeared on Russia Other Points of View http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/

By Anna Sulimina

Russia is set to lure more talented managers to the country by reducing red tape for foreign experts who earn over 2 million roubles ($65,000) per year and offering them tax concessions.

From January 2011, qualified specialists will be granted work permits within 14 days of a written request of the employer - and bypassing the quota set by the Federal Migration Service - if the bill is passed on its second reading in the Duma on Friday. 

This procedure currently requires companies employing foreigners to apply from 12 to 23 months beforehand.
Together with a work permit of up to three years, experts and their families will gain permanent residency in Russia and will pay the flat rate 13 per cent tax from the start, instead of paying 30 per cent for any year in which they are in the country less than six months.

"This could radically change the bulky process of recruiting foreigners and make Russian companies more flexible hiring expats," said Irina Kurganova of the Manpower
recruitment agency. "I suppose big international players may totally reform their HR-policy from now on [and it] will also be handy for local companies aiming to work abroad."

Help for Skolkovo

The Skolkovo high-tech business centre will be one of the main destinations for foreign specialists who will be given the special visa status. Other big companies employing top managers are also keen on the changes, but say it won't influence them very much.

"All steps that remove red-tape obstacles are good for us," said Nikolai Gorelov, a spokesman for TNK-BP.  "However the company has a well-organised system of hiring and replacing top managers and takes time anyway to hire a top-position expat."

TNK-BP became embroiled in a visa battle in 2008 when many of their top managers were refused entry in what many claimed was a struggle for control of the company between Russian shareholders and BP. Russian companies have also praised the new laws, saying it makes it easier for them to employ experienced foreigners.


Changes welcome

"We welcome any changes in the law that will ease the hiring of foreigners for us," said Russian telecoms operator Vimpelcom, which employs 13 foreign top managers.
Nick Rees of recruitment agency Star Search said it would make life easier for foreigners and Russians and that the new rules could encourage greater international investment into Russia if they are put into practice.

"Russia is known for its red-tape but [as it is] bouncing back from the economic crisis faster than most major countries, now would be a great time to take advantage of the huge talent pool abroad," said Rees. "In just a few years, these people will be replaced by local staff, so it's a win-win situation."

It may primarily help specialists and technical experts most, as present quota limits hit top managers less, but recruitment experts say that there is still more to be done.

Silly barriers

"Hiring foreigners is full of silly barriers. Today there are about 10,000-15,000 foreign specialists in Russia and they should be 10 times more. This would become reality if it wasn't so expensive for Russian employers," said Yury Virovets, president of Headhunter in Russia. "However the salary rate of 2 million roubles should be halved to make the law work."

Others claim that only big companies and those in top positions will benefit, while many businesses will continue to find ways to get the staff they need.
"All the big companies whose top managers earn this sort of money do not have any problems with quotas and paperwork, as they have whole departments to sort it out and apply in advance," said a visa expert, who asked not to be named.

International electronics producer Philips has also faced problems, with one top official moving to the CIS branch denied for "lacking qualifications".

According to a survey carried out by international recruitment web site The Network at the beginning of the year, Russia rates 32nd out of 35 countries where people want to work.

Originally published on http://english.ecoplan.ru

By Gordon Hahn

In their March 31st opinion piece (In the New York Times)  “What Makes Chechen Women So Dangerous?” Robert Pape, Lindsey O’Rourke and Jenna McDermit convincingly show that they know little about the “insurgents” in Russia’s North Caucasus.  "Something is driving Chechen suicide bombers, but it is hardly global jihad," they claim.   Few statements could be more false.

The jihadization of the Chechen separatist movement began early on, from a seed in 1994 when Shamil Basaev visited to Al Qa`ida (AQ) training camps in Khost, Afghanistan.  A July 2002 Shura meeting consolidated the globally-oriented Salafist jihadi element's hold on the top command of the then ‘Chechen Republic of Ichkeria’ (ChRI).  By October 2007 the jihadist element had taken full control, abolishing the ChRI, excommunicating the diminished and largely self-exiled nationalist/Sufi element, and declaring a strict Sharia law state, the “Caucasus Emirate” (CE). The CE laid claim to the entire North Caucasus and declared jihad on the U.S., Great Britain, Israel and any other country fighting Muslims anywhere on the globe.  Does this sound like a battle for mere ‘Chechen independence’?

The CE is irrefutably an integral part of the global jihadi social movement and is loosely allied with AQ and other globally-oriented jihdist organizations.  Caucasus and even Tatar Muslims are fighting in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, and foreign jihadists from AQ and elsewhere fight under, funnel funds to, and hold leadership posts in the CE.  It glorifies the ‘heroic jihad’ in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somali etc.  Its propaganda videos mix pictures of CE mujahedin, pro-jihadi Saudi sheikhs, and global jihadists like Usama bin Laden, declaring: “The Caliphate – We Are One Umma.”

Its ideology and theology are purely Salafist in nature.  Its websites are filled with the musings of the leading Salafist theologians, scholars, and pundits of jihad such as Qutb, Ibn Taymiyya, Maqdisi just to name a few.  Maqdisi, identified by West Point’s Counter-Terrorism Center as the most influential ideologist within the global jihadi movement, endorsed the CE and its Sharia Court 'qadi' Anzor Astemirov-Seifullah, who purveys Maqdisi’s writings in the Caucasus and passes death sentences on the "Chechen separatists" who Pape and company (and most others) think are still in charge.  Seifullah’s website recently published the infamous fatwa rationalizing the use of weapons of mass destruction to kill tens of millions of American “infidels.”  Maqdisi and other Arab sheikhs help funnel funding for the CE jihad from all over the Islamic world.

The authors perhaps could be excused if their problem was simply clumsy methodology.  Their sample of suicide bombers was perhaps unintentionally tainted; half of their suicide bombing cases are from the period 2001-2003 period, when the ChRI was somewhat less jihadized than now.  This mistake, combined with a misguided and uninformed attempt to extrapolate from the narrow focus on ‘Chechen’ female suicide bombers’ motives in order to draw broader conclusions about the overall Caucasus jihadi movement, are what perhaps produced their grossly mistaken conclusions about the CE’s ideology and goals.

To be sure, their narrow number-crunching approach, shorn of even basic knowledge about the CE's leadership, top operatives, ideology, and stated goals, reflects the methodogical myopia and scientific malpractice that plagues so much of contemporary political 'science'.  But such myopia and malpractice have grave analytical consequences.  Thus, for Pape and company the recent post-October 2007 suicide-bombing campaign was organized and executed by 'Chechen rebels', not jihadists allied with the global jihadi movement.

Pape and company could have learned something about the Caucasus jihadists. They might examine the thousands of CE official statements, articles and video lectures like those of the leading CE operative, the half-Buryat, half-Russian, former Buddhist, Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, who was killed by Russian forces on March 3.  Born Alexander Tikhomirov, Buryatskii lived in Buryatia, a thousand miles from the Caucasus, converted to Islam, went to study in Egypt, and then joined the jihad.  He copiously described his own religious motivation and that of the suicide bombers he recruited and trained for the CE’s revived ‘Riyadus Salikhin’ Martys’ Battalion (RS).

This sort of painstaking research would have forced Pape and company to confront hard facts. For example, the onset of the new wave of suicide bombings they saw began after October 2007, coinciding exactly with the declaration of the CE in the same month and Buryatskii's arrival seven months later.

Indeed, researching the CE would have revealed to them much about their narrow research focus on suicide bombers.  For example, like the two female suicide bombers involved in the Moscowsubway bombings last month, some of them were married to jihadists, meaning they sympathized with the cause and may have been recruited to take revenge on the infidels when their husbands met their inevitable deaths in battle after shooting a traffic cop or blowing up a truck full of MVD personnel.

At one point in their article Pape and company do go beyond their narrow methodology only to unwittingly expose the perverse cherry-picking nature of their data selection.  Referencing a single statement by CE amir Doku Abu Usman Umarov (whom they refer to obliquely as "one of Chechnya's leading rebel commanders"), they write that he has "made clear that his campaign was not about restoring any Islamic caliphate, but about Chechen independence.”  To support this faulty claim, they misuse one sentence from Umarov: “This is the land of our brothers and it is our sacred duty to liberate these lands.”

First, anyone with even superficial knowledge of global and CE’s jihadists would know that “brothers” refers to fellow Muslims across the umma, not simply the Chechens in Chechnya.

Second, Pape and his investigators apparently never pursued what exactly the CE means by its “lands.”  When Umarov was a simple field commander in 2004, he called for opening up fronts in Siberia and the Far East – that is, on Russia’s Pacific coast!  As amir, in 2006 he added the far away Urals and Volga Fronts to the Caucasus and Dagestan Fronts established by his predecessor.  Just a few weeks ago, perhaps while Pape and company were writing, Umarov declared the CE’s intent to liberate Krasnodar Territory (part of the North Caucasus) and Astrakhan Province and the Volga area outside the Caucasus.  In a map the CE uses to depict its territory, it is comprised of the entire North Caucasus, including predominantly ethnic-Russian populated regions like Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories.  Other Russian territory north of the CE and the Transcaucasus lying to its south – including Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – are labeled “occupied Muslim lands.”  Although the Caucasus mujahedin have had limited success in establishing their ‘combat jamaats’ to these other regions, there have been some temporary successes and incursions.

Thus, Pape and company cherry-picked and distorted the meaning of a single sentence from Umarov to support an interpretation that diametrically contradicts hundreds of statements by Umarov and others explicitly revealing the CE’s broad jihadist agenda: the pursuit of an emirate as one of the building blocks of a future calpihate.  This degree of academic ignorance suggests that their work is at best an exercise in denial and self-delusion and at worst a deliberate disinformation and falsification of the record.

Regarding the Russian state’s violence, Pape and company, as well as many others, would do well to remember that at this point there would be neither Russian counter-terrorism operations nor the frequent violations of the Caucasus Muslims’ human rights if there were no jihad.  CE jihadism drives the continued violence, not Moscow. 
Moreover, it is the North Caucasus terrorists who have perpetrated the overwhelming majority of the violence in the regions since the end of the second post-Soviet Russo-Chechen war in 2001. The ‘Chechen Republic of Ichkeria,’  the Caucasus Emirate’s predecessor organization carried out hundreds of terrorist attacks in Russia from 2002 to 2007, killing hundreds and wounding thousandscivilians, government officials, police, military, and security personnel.  Since its creation in October 2007 the CE jihadists have committed over 900 terrorist attacks on Russian territory killing more than 900 and wounding more than 1,500 civilians, government officials, police, military, and security personnel.

Most importantly, last week’s suicide bombings show that the CE can and are willing to carry out operations virtually anywhere in Russia, sowing death and havoc among civilians.  Given that there are numerous soft targets belonging to the U.S. and other countries in Russia, and given that Russia holds the world's largest stockpiles of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons and materials, the CE’s expanding reach is a real threat to both U.S. and international security.  Here, shoddy and politically biased ‘research’ is a luxury we can ill afford.

This opinion article originally appeared on Russia Other Points of View www.russiaotherpointsofview.com  Dr. Hahn is one of the foremost sources of independent  research and information on the Caucasus Emirate

Dr. Gordon Hahn is a Senior Researcher in the Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program and an Adjunct Professor at the Graduate School of International Policy Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies and a Senior Researcher at the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group. He is author of two books: Russia's Islamic Threat (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007) and Russia's Revolution From Above: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime, 1985-2000 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002)

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