Second, he made the mistake of beginning a political liberalization, then seemingly backtracked on the hope of millions by deciding to run for the presidency.  He appeared to back Dmitrii Medvedev for the presidency in 2008––and did not interfere in any significant way when Medvedev began to push his more liberal ideas regarding the MVD, the courts and sentencing laws, the prison system, the state-centric economy, the media and much else.  This produced rising expectations may yet provoke a societal backlash if they are perceived as being deferred.  By deciding to run for the presidency himself and thereby depriving Medvedev of a second term at this time, Putin gave at least the impression of ending the liberalization––even if he does not intend to do so in reality.  The slow pace of political reform – limited to peripheral issues such as lowering the percent of the vote needed for parties to enter the Duma in the 2016 elections and requiring by law equal television time and debate participation by parties – followed by Putin’s decision to run and the unfree and unfair Duma elections in late 2011, led to the explosion of public outrage.

Third, Putin didn’t respond adequately to the expression of popular will represented during the December demonstrations––ridiculing the demonstrators as he made small concessions to the spirit of their demands.  This negated any good will he might have garnered from the concessions.  At his annual address to the Federal Assembly on December 15, Medvedev’s tone and serious political reform proposals were the proper response, but these underscored Putin’s overreaching decision to elbow Medvedev out of the presidency.

A fourth error is Putin’s recent refusal to take part in the presidential debates leading up to the March 4th presidential election.  And a fifth is not doing enough to ensure that the vote itself is carried out more honestly, which will further undermine his legitimacy in the eyes of many.

Putin’s natural inclinations do not serve him well in the new political atmosphere.  In particular, his denigration of the fair election demonstrators and his decision not to join in the debates inject potentially explosive irritants into Russia’s new open politics.

Recent public opinion polls show that he may be in danger of being forced into a second round runoff in the presidential vote.  The Levada Center’s December polling found that only 36 percent of decided voters intend to vote for Putin.  Even if Putin takes that share of those voters who have not decided whether they will vote (11 percent) and who have not decided for whom to vote (22 percent), he would win only 48 percent, forcing a runoff with the second-place finisher. Dividing undecided votes in the same way, other agencies’ late December and early January polling also show Putin under 50 percent, respectively: FOM – 49 percent (44 percent plus that percent of the 11 percent undecided) and VTsIOM – 48 percent (no undecided potential voter figure indicated).  I am inclined to give more credence to Levada’s polls, but we can average the three polls for objectivity’s sake and give Putin 48.7 percent.

This means that Putin needs to win more votes than he has now and therefore must be mindful not to antagonize voters.  If his numbers decline, then he may need to employ more pre-election administrative resources and even allow more ballot stuffing and falsification of the count, further deliegitimizing both the vote and his presidency.  Already the news programs of the main state television channel ‘First Channel’ include long pieces of five minutes in length covering Putin managing the country by dressing down governors and criticizing other officials.  Such additional miscalculations risk creating more problems by provoking the population and strengthening the nascent ‘white revolution,’ making it less amenable to negotiating or fizzling out.

Enter Putin’s January 16 article “inviting society to a discussion” about Russia’s future course.  Overall, the article does not solve any of Putin’s problems.  However, the assumption of the need for democracy and to “perfect the political system” suggests he may be open to change. By emphasizing that Russian society has changed, a middle class has formed, an educational revolution has occurred, and the middle class is entering politics, Putin took credit for these changes.  He noted: “(T)oday's claim for the highest standards of living and democracy are the best indication of our success.”  Putin’s acknowledgement that the opposition demonstrations demanding real democracy are positive prepares him perhaps to take the logical next step: give in to the calls for democratic transformation (Vladimir Putin, “Rossiya sosreditochivaetsya – vyzovy, na kotoryie my dolzhny otvetit,” Izvestiya, 16 January 2012).  Assuming that Medvedev’s December 15th proposals for democratizing the system regarding the Duma elections, election of governors, and the president were agreed upon with Putin.  These ambitious proposals also suggest Putin’s willingness to meet at least some of the opposition’s demands.

If so, this is a break with his past form; a break Putin is capable of, given his penchant for strategic and tactical flexibility and practicality, as opposed to ideological rigidity.  The question remains: When will the further steps being proposed to ensure the new institutional environment be accompanied by a change in the behavior of bureaucrats responsible for ensuring free and fair elections.  Putin bypassed this subject in his article in favor of discussing the general situation both in the country and the world in which policies “after the elections” will be adopted.

At the end of his article, Putin promised that in the next few weeks he would offer “concrete ideas” on the issues he raised.  For Russia’s sake, they should include radical ideas on how to ensure compliance with electoral and other laws regarding all future Russian elections, including the March 4th presidential elections.  The transparent ballot boxes and closed circuit cameras he proposed in December are a good start, but much more needs to be done to impress upon the election commissions, other officials, party leaders, and citizens alike that violations will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.  Another faulty election will bring Russia, as one commentator succinctly put it, to a cold civil war or worse.

Dr. Gordon Hahn is a Senior Researcher in the Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program and an Adjunct Professor at the Graduate School of International Policy Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies and a Senior Researcher at the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group. He is author of two books: Russia's Islamic Threat (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007) and Russia's Revolution From Above: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime, 1985-2000 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002)